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Abstract
Why are some trade agreements concluded for a limited period of time while others have the
form of evergreen contracts supplemented with an advance termination notice clause? We use
a dynamic incomplete contracting model to demonstrate that the time structure of the trade
agreement is related to the nature of the underlying trade-related investments (or other types
of irreversible resource adjustments). If these investments are lumpy and specialized to trade in
a particular homogeneous good, the agreements with the xed term of duration are more likely.
The xed-term agreement provides incentives for the initial investment but leaves the parties
the exibility to revisit the need for future investment by resorting to renegotiation. If the
agreement covers trade in goods or services requiring incremental investments with spillovers of
the investment benets across industries, there is a lower risk of overinvestment. Therefore, the
parties are more likely to choose an evergreen agreement (with an advance termination notice or
an escape clause). We show that these predictions are consistent with the econometric evidence
on the trade agreements to which the U.S. is a party.
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1 Introduction
The vast majority of the World Trade Organizations members are signatory to one or more regional
trade agreements (RTAs) which, in the WTO parlance, refers to all bilateral, regional or plurilateral
trade agreements of a preferential nature. The proliferation of regionalism has continued unabated
since the early 1990s. More than 420 bilateral and plurilateral free trade agreements and customs
union agreements have been notied to the GATT and the WTO up to December 2009, of which
over 300 were notied after the creation of the WTO in 1995. The latest gures from the WTOs
Committee on Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA) suggest that it maintains a database of some
276 RTAs notied and in force as of May 2010.1
Trade agreements are rarely permanently binding upon the signatory parties. Most bilateral
and plurilateral trade agreements and treaties expressly allow a state to withdraw as long as it
follows certain procedures of notication. These are usually described in a nal clause that contains
provisions for the agreements duration or termination, or for the withdrawal of a party. According
to these nal clauses, agreements can be divided into two broad categories. Some trade agreements
are concluded for an indenite time and allow contracting parties to withdraw from the agreement
or to denounce the agreement by giving an advance notice to the other contracting party (parties).
Others stipulate trade on xed terms for a predened period of time. The nal clauses of the
agreements of the second type may contain a non-binding statement about the possibility of renewal
based on the mutual consent of the parties. Following the recent contract-theoretic literature, we
refer to the former type of trade agreements as evergreen agreements with advanced withdrawal
(or termination) notice, and the latter type as xed-term agreements.
For example, multilateral and plurilateral agreements that are parts of the WTO compact are
evergreen contracts with advance termination notice varying from 12 months (the Agreement on
Trade in Civil Aircraft) to 60 days (the International Dairy Agreement and the International Bovine
Meat Agreement). Other examples of evergreen trade agreements include the 1992 EC-US Agree-
ment on Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (12-month advance notice),2 the 2004 Euro-Mediterranean
Free Trade Area negotiated among the European Union, Israel, Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan and
Egypt (6-month advance notice); the 2001 agreement between Armenia and Kazakhstan (6-month
advance notice); and the 1997 Agreement on Arab Free Trade Area (12-month advance notice). The
examples of xed-term bilateral trade agreements include the 2001 agreement between Turkey and
Jamaica (5-year duration); the 1996 Canada-U.S. Softwood Lumber Agreements (5-year duration);
a series of rather short-term agreements concluded in the 1960s-90s between India and Tanzania
(with the duration ranging from 1 to 2 years) and India and Bangladesh (with the duration from
1The data on Regional Trade Agreements is repoted on the WTOs website
http://rtais.wto.org/ui/publicsummarytable.aspx (accessed May 16th, 2010).
2The 1992 EC-US Agreement on Large Civil Aircraft also allows an alternative termination mechanism in ex-
ceptional circumstances which was used by the US in October 2004. The Agreement states that in exceptional
circumstances a party may terminate the agreement within 15 days following consultations concerning a matter
leading to termination.
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2 to 3 years); and a series of the Lomé Convention trade-and-aid agreements between the EU and
a number of developing African, Caribbean, and Pacic countries, which were concluded for xed
terms ranging from 5 to 10 years.
A review of nal clauses in a large number of bilateral and plurilateral trade agreements suggests
that xed-term agreements are more common between parties whose bilateral trade is mostly in
homogeneous goods (e.g., commodities). This is the reason why most of the xed-term agreements
either include a commodity-exporting developing country as at least one of the parties (e.g., Lomé
Convention, India-Bangladesh, and Turkey-Jamaica agreements) or concern sectoral trade between
developed countries in a homogeneous commodity (e.g., lumber, oil, or gas). On the other hand,
evergreen bilateral trade agreements (with advance notice) are characteristic of countries that trade
primarily in manufacturing goods and services. It is therefore not surprising that bilateral trade
agreements between developed countries usually have unlimited duration. We have studied all the
bilateral and plurilateral trade agreements to which the U.S. is a party and which are currently in
e¤ect (see Appendix B4), and have found that it is indeed true that agreements are more likely to
be of xed duration as opposed to being evergreen if they cover trade in commodities and if they
are concluded with less developed countries (see Figure 1).
Out of the 98 agreements that we have been able to classify, 56 covered trade in commodities,
out of which 23 were xed term agreements (and 33 evergreen). Amont the other 42 agreements,
the vast majority (35) were evergreen and only 7 were xed-term. In Table 1, we compare the
characteristics of the xed-term and of the evergreen agreements and nd that xed-term agreee-
ments are signicantly more likely to cover trade in commodities. In Appendix B, we carry out
a simple econometric exercise and show that a xed-term agreement is more likely to cover the
trade in commodities even if we control for the partnerslevel of development and democracy (see
Appendix B).
Table 1. Characteristics of xed-term and evergreen trade agreements based on the
comprehensive sample of the US trade agreements. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Source: US Trade Compliance Center (as of July 2007, see Appendix B for details).
All the di¤erences are statistically signicant at 1% level.
Fixed-term Evergreen
Total number 30 68
Per cent covering trade in commodities
0:77
(0:08)
0:49
(0:06)
Log (GDP per capita of trade partners at the time of signing)
7:4
(0:2)
9:0
(0:2)
GDP per capita of partners as a share
of the US GDP per capita (at the time of signing)
0:17
(0:05)
0:53
(0:06)
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Figure 1: Non-parametric relationship between the level of development (log GDP per capita to
US GDP per capita at the time of signing the agreement) of the party to a trade agreement with
the US and the probability the contract is a xed-term (rather than evergreen) agreement. Source:
98 US trade agreements.
How can we explain these patterns? International economics literature focuses on two main
reasons why countries might want to sign a trade agreement (Bagwell and Staiger, 2002): (1) trade
agreements allow countries to internalize terms-of-trade externalities created by unilateral trade
policies (i.e., to overcome the prisoners dilemma that arises in trade policies between countries
with market power in international trade); and (2) trade agreements serve as commitment devices
against domestic political economy pressures for protection (e.g., Grossman and Helpman, 1995
and Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare, 1998). In this paper, we discuss an alternative theory. We
assume that countriesmain motive for signing enforceable trade agreements is for protection of
investments associated with irreversible and costly export-specialization policies (e.g., development
of trade-related infrastructure) that make the government conducting such polices vulnerable to a
hold-up by its trade partner.
Yarbrough and Yarbrough (1992) provide many examples of costly and irreversible trade-related
investments and trade policies. Many governments undertake trade-related investments as part of
export-promotion and industrial targeting policies. Although the wisdom of industrial targeting
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and export promotion policies have been questioned in the economics literature, it is undeniable
that governments throughout the world often resort to these policies (see Hausmann and Rodrik,
2006). For example, export-oriented economic activities often require specic inputs for which
markets do not exist and which have characteristics of public goods (e.g., regulations, standards,
certication, accreditation, provision of certain elements of infrastructure). Many of these public
goods di¤erentially benet particular economic activities. Therefore, it is unavoidable that gov-
ernments engage in industrial targeting policies in the sense of providing public assets with a high
degree of specicity to selected economic activities and to trade partners.
Three assumptions are critical for our argument. First, the trade-related investment (or the
policy decision) undertaken by the exporting country government is not only irreversible, but also,
to a certain extent, specic to the export destination; the full value of the investment cannot be
realized if access to that export market is inhibited. Taken to the extreme, this assumption implies
that the investment is useful only for exporting to a particular trade-partner country. More broadly,
this assumption means that if the designated export market were shut o¤, an alternative destination
for the export product would be less protable for the exporters.
Our second assumption is that time is not only a dimension along which the countries in-
vestment, trade and negotiating decisions unfold, but also is a critical variable entering a contract,
either as the duration of contractual obligations, or as the advance-notice time for certain unilateral
actions. Third, although member countries cannot deviate from the terms of the existing trade
agreement, they can renegotiate it at any time.
While the benets of lasting trade agreements are compelling, they also involve certain costs.
As desired trade policies may change dramatically over a short period of time because of economic
and political shocks, renegotiating the market access commitments xed in an agreement may be
quite costly. The presence of these costs and benets makes the analysis of trade agreements
similar to the incomplete contract theory (Grossman and Hart, 1986, Hart, 1995) and in particular
to the theory of incomplete contracts on time (Guriev and Kvasov, 2005). The parties choosing
the duration of the contract, have to resolve the incentive-exibility tradeo¤. If the duration of the
trade agreement is too short, there will be no incentives to invest. If the agreements duration is
too long, it will reduce the partiesexibility to react to external shocks. Although the outdated
agreement may be renegotiated, the renegotiated agreement may also be too long and, thus, provide
excessively strong investment incentives. The risk of over-investment or of over-specialization is
as tangible as that of under-investment. Moreover, this risk is costly for both trade partners, not
only for the investing party. Indeed, in a bilateral trade relationship, for the exporting country to
specialize in a particular export sector, it must have guaranteed access to the export market for a
su¢ ciently long period to protect itself from the risk of hold-up. The greater the exporting countrys
trade-specic investment, the larger is the compensation the importing country has to provide to
the exporting country for the upfront investment costs, by expanding the duration of its market-
access obligations. This is why many countries are reluctant to sign long-term trade agreements
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even if there are substantial mutual benets. A good example is the perennial debate among the
EU governments on signing an agreement with Russia on the long-term supply of natural gas.
The terms of the agreement proposed by Russia include a large-scale investment in a gas pipeline,
which Russia will undertake in exchange for guaranteed long term contracts committing the EU
to purchasing Russias gas. The EU governments are reluctant to sign the agreement on Russias
terms because of the uncertainty about the future of the energy markets.
The optimal time structure of the trade agreement should take into account the trade-o¤ be-
tween providing e¢ cient incentives for investment today and making sure that there will be no
overinvestment tomorrow. Fixed-term contracts and evergreen contracts help resolve this tradeo¤
in very di¤erent ways. As shown in Guriev and Kvasov (2005), in either case, it is possible to ensure
e¢ cient investments, but there is an important distinction: the xed-term contract is inherently
vulnerable to renegotiation while the evergreen contract with advance termination notice can be
made renegotiation-proof. Below, we use an example to show that such renegotiation-proofness is
useful in some circumstances but not in others.
Consider the bilateral trade setting where one party can make trade-related investments. As
investment is not contractible, there is a risk of hold-up; therefore, in order to protect the investment
incentives, the parties must sign a binding trade agreement that guarantees market access for the
investing trade partner. This agreement can be concluded either for a xed number of years ; or
for an indenite duration with the advance termination-notice period  (or with an escape clause).
Under the xed-term agreement, the longer the agreements duration , the greater incentives
to invest; thus one can nd the optimal length of the agreement ; that would provide e¢ cient
incentives to invest. Now suppose that a new trade-related investment opportunity arises next
year. With probability p this new investment project is socially optimal (i.e., it improves the joint
welfare of the countries) and should be undertaken, and with probability q it is socially suboptimal
and should not be carried out. With probability 1   p   q there will be no new trade-related
investment opportunity.
The incentives to undertake this new project are very di¤erent under the xed-term agreement
and under the evergreen agreement with an advance notice clause. If the trade agreement has a xed
term of duration , next year the parties only have  1 years remaining under the trade agreement,
which represents insu¢ cient incentives for undertaking the investment project which requires at
least  years. If the investment project is jointly optimal, the parties have to renegotiate and replace
the agreement with a new one for  years. Under the evergreen agreement, the opposite is true. Next
year, the agreement will provide the very same incentives to invest as this year. This means that if
the investment is optimal, there is no need to renegotiate. However, if it is suboptimal, parties have
to scrap the agreement because otherwise the foreign country will over-specialize (i.e., will undertake
a jointly-suboptimal investment). Therefore, the choice of the agreement will depend on the cost of
renegotiation and on whether the risk of overinvestment is greater than that of underinvestment (q
is greater than p). If the risk of overinvestment is large (i.e., q is high), a xed-term agreement will
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do better. If, on the other hand, the main danger is the future underinvestment (i.e., not having
a su¢ ciently long-term market-access agreement in place when the probability of value-increasing
invesment opportunity, p, is high) and renegotiation is costly, the parties will choose the evergreen
type of agreement.
Even though renegotiation costs may be substantial, in reality they are certainly lower than
the potential losses due to overinvestment or underinvestment caused by the ine¢ cient duration
of the existing trade agreement. Therefore, the ine¢ cient agreement will always be renegotiated
in equilibrium. If the trade agreement provides incentives for a value-destroying investment, it
will be replaced by another trade agreement, which removes such an incentive, once the investment
opportunity arrives. If the trade agreement does not provide adequate incentives for undertaking
an investment when it is jointly optimal, a new trade agreement of su¢ cient duration will take its
place. On the other hand, as the renegotiation costs are not trivial,3 the choice of the agreement
should minimize the likelihood of such renegotiation.
The example above outlines the properties of the optimal agreement. If the risk of overspecial-
ization is relatively large, we should see the xed-term trade agreement that provides incentives for
investment today but discourages investment tomorrow. This is applicable to trade in commodi-
ties where supporting investments are typically one-o¤ and lumpy. If such an investment turns
out ine¢ cient, the welfare cost may be very high for both parties. For example, if a long-term
agreement on the import of crude oil provides incentives for upgrading pipelines and oil terminals
(i.e., trade-partner-specic and good-specic investments), then the optimally-designed agreement
makes sure that the oil-exporting party undertakes only those upgrades that are jointly e¢ cient
for the parties.
In the case of trade in less commoditized products, the situation is di¤erent. Production and
transportation capacity related to trade in goods or services characterized by vertical or horizontal
product di¤erentiation is typically less lumpy as it allows small scale incremental investments
aimed at improving a particular aspect (or module) of the traded product variety. Even more
importantly, investments related to trade in goods characterized by greater product di¤erentiation
are typically leakybecause of the spillovers of the investment benets across related varieties of
the di¤erentiated product. These characteristics of investments in less commoditized (and more
di¤erentiated) goods lower the risk of over-investing in them. Indeed, an investment that enhances
gains from trade in one product variety today will likely produce spillover benets that may enhance
gains from trade in another variety tomorrow. For example, human capital investments (or labor-
market adjustment policies) in a country specializing in outsourced software design can be shared
by a large number of software product varieties.
The distinction we draw between the investments in the homogeneous commodity industry and
the di¤erentiated product industry is similar to the notion of the product space with the varying
3One has to take into account full economic costs of renegotiation, not only the direct legal costs. The full economic
costs are related to the fact that trade negotiations take time; and each day of delays involves foregone gains from
trade and unrealized investment opportunities.
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degree of relatedness among products, which was introduced in Hausmann and Klinger (2007)
and Hidalgo et al. (2007). These papers dene the relatedness or distance between the goods
through the degree of substitutability between the specic assets (e.g., human or physical capital,
infrastructure, regulatory framework, and property rights regimes) required to produce the goods.
Due to the varying degree of relatedness among goods and services, some parts of the product
spaceare dense while others are sparse. This implies that countries that are specialized in a dense
part of the product space have an easier time at changing their export mix than countries that
are specialized in more disconnected products located in a sparse part. Hausmann and Klinger
(2007) observe that the densest part of the product space tends to be dominated by manufactured
products while homogeneous goods and commodities (e.g., oil, mineral ores, timber and cotton,
and un-processed agricultural goods) are located in the sparse areas of the product space. They
also provide evidence that in general, rich (poor) countries tend to be specialized in dense (sparse)
parts of the product space.
As increasingly common in the recent trade literature, we assume that trade agreements are
externally enforced (albeit incomplete) contracts. In principle, our argument could be made in a
setting with self-enforced agreements. We choose the former setup for the sake of simplicity. As we
study agreements that span several periods and may include escape clauses, solving for equilibria
in repeated games would be particularly cumbersome.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the related literature
on trade and contract theory. Section 3 describes the setup of the model. In Section 4, we solve
for incentives under the xed-term and the evergreen trade agreements. Section 5 concludes.
2 Related literature
The theoretical literature on the relationship between preferential trade agreements and mulilateral
trade liberalization is very broad and goes back to the 1950s. The notable examples include Viner
(1950), Riezman (1979), Kennan and Riezman (1990), Krugman (1991), Bond and Syropoulos
(1996), Bagwell and Staiger (1997a,b), Syropoulos (1999), and Bond et al. (2004). Several strands
of that theoretical literature are closely related to our paper. First, there is research on the dynamic
e¤ects of trade policy via irreversible investment. Krugman (1987) models the irreversible e¤ects of
trade policies in the context of dynamic economies of scale. In that paper, a temporary protectionist
policy reduces gains from trade but provides incentives for investment in the sector with dynamic
economies of scale. Our paper is also close to the argument discussed informally in Yarbrough
and Yarbrough (1992) and to the analysis conducted by MacLaren (1997) who suggested that,
without durable trade agreements, irreversible trade-related investments and intersectoral resource
adjustments (e.g., labor and capital reallocations in and out of the export sector) are vulnerable to
a hold-up by the trading partner. Another closely related paper is Bond (2006) which considers the
trade-o¤ between the governmentsneed to protect irreversible trade-specic investment and the
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desire to maintain a degree of policy exibility in the environment with uncertain terms of trade.4
One implication of the MacLarens and Bonds papers is that the costlier the trade partner-specic
investment, the longer the duration of the trade agreement specifying the partiesmarket access
committments. However, these papers do not provide any insights as to why some trade agreements
are concluded for a xed term while others are indenite (with advance termination notice or a
temporary escape clause).
To the extent the irreversibility of trade-related investments or sluggishness in trade policy-
induced resource adjustment plays a part in our analysis, explaining the duration and term struc-
ture of trade agreements bears similarity to the question of why trade liberalization tends to be
implemented gradually, rather than being introduced at once at the conclusion of the initial agree-
ment. Staiger (1995), Devereux (1997), and Furusawa and Lai (1999), have shown that the presence
of rent-earning factors in the import sector, learning-by-doing in the export sector, and the adjust-
ment costs of moving resources in and out of the import-competing sector, can help to explain the
gradual pace of trade liberalization. More recently, Bond and Park (2002) and Chisik (2003) have
analyzed mechanisms leading to gradualism in trade liberalization which are based on, respectively,
the consumption-smoothing incentives of a small country and the irreversibility of investments in
the export sector. The main di¤erence between this literature and our paper is that we depart
from the assumption of self-enforced tari¤ commitments and explicitly model the factors a¤ecting
the countrieschoices regarding the duration and term structure of trade agreements.
Another related theme in the international economics literature is the e¤ect of uncertainty
on the structure of international trade agreements. The earlier papers by Bagwell and Staiger
(1990, 2003, 2005), Riezman (1991), and Rosendor¤ and Milner (2001) consider trade agreements
negotiated and enforced in the presence of uncertainty about either the trade volume or terms of
trade. All of these papers point out that self-enforcing trade agreements will unravel unless, to
decrease their incentives to defect, countries implement more protectionist policies during periods
of trade volume surges. Therefore, these papers interpret periods of high tari¤s legitimized by the
safeguards and escape clauses of the GATT/WTO legal system, not as instances of non-cooperative
behavior but rather as an attempt by countries to maintain the self-enforcing nature of international
cooperation in the environment with volatile trade volume.5 In another related paper, Chisik (2009)
considers the e¤ect of uncertainty in a model with irreversible quality choices and shows that under
4MacLaren (1997) models these investments as trade-partner-specic and irreversible specialization of human
capital while Bond (2006) studies the case where parties invest in infrastructure to reduce trade costs. While these
two setups are somewhat di¤erent, the main ideas carry on from one framework to the other one. For simplicitys
sake, we follow Bonds approach.
5Klimenko et al. (2008) consider the role of escape clauses in the environment with the terms-of-trade uncer-
tainty where countries have to rely on exogenous enforcement of trade agreements because continuous renegotiation
completely undermines the countriesability to sustain self-enforced cooperation. In their setting, the ability of the
escape clause to enhance the value of the trade agreement depends on the extent to which the information about the
realizations of the stochastic terms-of-trade variable is veriable by the dispute settlement body, which adjudicates
disputes over alleged violations of trade agreements.
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preferential trade agreementsunlike WTOhigh uncertainty results in ine¢ ciently low quality.
Although our model of trade agreements does not include the possibility of escape clauses, their
role would be very similar to the role of another common clause incorporated in trade agreements:
the advance notice for unilateral termination, that plays the central role in our setting. The
obligation to give the advance notice limits opportunities for hold-up and therefore protects the
incentives to invest. Even if there is a shock that makes termination mutually benecial, the
advance notice of  periods provides the party that undertook a trade-related investment, with
a guaranteed compensation of at least -periods-worth of trade gains. A similar compensating
mechanism is included in the typical escape clause. If a country prompted by a terms-of-trade
shock imposes a protectionist measure by invoking the escape clause for the duration of  periods,
and this temporary surge of protection a¤ects the returns on investments undertaken by other
members of the trade agreement, the country that invoked the escape clause has to provide its
trade partners a compensation worth  periods of the trade gains promised to them under the
terms of the agreement.6 Therefore, the advance termination-notice clause and the temporary
escape clause perform similar functions: they protect the investment incentives.
A relatively recent but fast-growing thread in the international economics literature emphasizes
contractual incompleteness of international trade agreements which are enforced exogenously. Bat-
tigalli and Maggi (2003) examine the role of international agreements on product standards and
show how the incompleteness of the trade agreements provides a role for a central dispute settle-
ment mechanism. Horn, Maggi and Staiger (2005) consider trade agreements with an endogenous
level of contractual incompleteness determined by the contracting costs. Horn (2006) analyzes the
role of the National Treatment principle of the WTO in overcoming contractual incompleteness of
the international trade agreements. Maggi and Staiger (2008) assume that a dispute settlement
institution (DSI) is able to choose the degree of contractual incompleteness of the trade agreement,
and characterize the DSI design that would be optimal for governments under various contracting
conditions. Yet another strand of literature (e.g., Antras and Helpman, 2004) applies incomplete
contract theory to the problem of hold-up and vertical integration in the contractual environment
involving rms transacting across the international border, rather than governments contracting
on trade policies.
Our paper both builds on, and contributes to, the theoretical literature on contracts. Starting
with Grossman and Hart (1986), the formal theory of holdup has emphasized the role of long-
term contracts in protecting incentives for partner-specic investment. Our model is most closely
related to Harris and Holmstrom (1987) and Guriev and Kvasov (2005). Harris and Holmstrom
(1987) consider contract dynamics with positive renegotiation costs. Their rationale for long-term
6Moreover, as discussed in detail in Bagwell and Staiger (2005), the international legal system typically requires
that after the expiration of the escape clause which lasted for  periods, the earliest time the escape clause can be
invoked again, is  periods after the end of previous escape clause. Therefore, the investing party is guaranteed the
present value of the gains from trade for the period of [t; t+ 2] where t is the time when the escape clause is invoked
the rst time.
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contracts is risk-sharing (between a risk-neutral employer and risk-averse employee) rather than
investment incentives. Harris and Holmstrom (1987) analyze the trade-o¤ between the costs and
the benets of renegotiation (due to the ine¢ ciency of the obsolete contract) and solve for the
optimal contract length. Guriev and Kvasov (2005) study incomplete contracts in continuous time
where intertemporal linkages are driven by both contracting and investment. They nd the optimal
contract duration and the length of the advance notice that resolve the abovementioned incentive-
exibility tradeo¤ for xed-term contracts and evergreen contracts. In their basic model (which
assumes that there are only two states of nature and that renegotiation is costless), these two
contract types are equivalent: either can implement the rst best.
The contribution of the present paper to the contract theory literature is to emphasize the
di¤erence between the two types of contracts in a more realistic setting of trade agreements. We
show that, while the contract duration is chosen to provide incentives for investment at the inception
of the contract, the availability of the alternative contract types allows for another degree of freedom.
Having two distinct contract types helps to di¤erentiate incentives for investment at the inception
of the contract and at the contracts more mature stages. The xed-term contract provides weaker
incentives for the future investments than for the present investment. The evergreen contract
protects the present and the future investments equally well. Therefore, investment incentives
depend not only on the duration of the contract but also on the type of the contract. This, in
turn, implies that the choice of the contract type depends on the characteristics of both the present
investment and the future investments as well as on the renegotiation costs.
3 Setup
We consider a discrete time model of trade between two countries, home and foreign. In every
period, countries can trade, and the foreign country can make an investment reducing its cost of
exporting to the home country in the future periods. We begin our analysis by assuming that
the foreign country exports a single homogenous good (i.e., a commodity). The foreign countrys
investment is lumpy,which is captured by the assumption that in every period the investment
is either 0 or 1. This assumption is intended to capture the di¤erence between trade-facilitating
investments for the homogeneous good industry and the di¤erentiated (i.e., non-commoditized)
good industry. The examples of such lumpy investments intended to facilitate trade in homogeneous
goods include the construction of large scale transportation or storage facilities for commodities
(e.g., lumber-shipping ports, oil terminals, gas pipelines, electricity grids). By contrast, the main
characteristic of investments in the di¤erentiated product industry is their leakynature. While
trade-facilitating investment projects may be initiated for each variety of the di¤erentiated good, the
accumulated stock of these investments is generic to the entire industry because of the spillovers of
investment benets across product varieties. Moreover, investments for individual product varieties
incrementally increase the capacity of the entire di¤erentiated good industry. To make investment
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in the di¤erentiated- and homogeneous-good industries comparable, we assume that there is a
continuum of di¤erentiated good varieties of measure 1 and the investment for each variety can be
either 0 or 1. Because of its leaky nature, the investment reducing the cost of trade for variety i
also reduces the trade cost for variety j:7 Since the probability of an investment for each variety
of the di¤erentiated good as well as for the homogeneous good is the same, the expected volume
of trade-related investments in the di¤erentiated good industry is between 0 and 1, i.e., exactly
as in the homogeneous good industry. But since investments in the di¤erentiated good industry
are undertaken independently for each variety, they do not have the all-or-nothing property of the
lumpy investment in the homogeneous industry.
In what follows we describe our model in a few steps. First, we consider a two-country trade
framework and characterize the outcome of the single-period trade game by solving for the optimal
tari¤s and for the Nash equilibrium. We then introduce the trade-related investments and describe
their e¤ect on the trade cost. This allows us to provide the micro-foundations of countriespayo¤s
by presenting them as functions of trade-policy and investment variables. Secondly, we describe
the nature of uncertainty and the evolution of states of nature over time. Thirdly, we describe the
timing of decisions within a period of the model. And nally, we describe the rst best. Using the
solution to the Bellman equation for the joint returns on investment, we derive the countriespayo¤s
for the alternative types of trade agreements and characterize the parameter values for which trade-
facilitating investment is jointly optimal, either if the countries trade in the di¤erentiated product
or if they trade the homogenous product and the state of nature is good.
3.1 Trade and trade-related investments
The stage game is derived from the basic two-country, two-good framework previously considered
by Johnson (1953/54), Mayer (1981) and Dixit (1987). We provide only a terse review of the main
elements of this framework. There are countries, home (no ) and foreign (). These countries
exchange two goods x and y. The home country exports good y in exchange for imports of good x
from the foreign country. In this subsection, we assume that both x and y are homogenous goods.
In the subsection 3.4, we will consider an alternative setup where x represents a di¤erentiated
product with a continuum of possible varieties.8
7The di¤erence between the two types of goods can be seen in the following example. In the case of commodities,
such as lumber, oil, or gas, the necessary investments usually have a very high degree of specicity and have no
e¤ect on the production cost of any other good (e.g., a gas pipeline requires a lumpy indivisible investment; also, it
cannot be used for transporting oil). By contrast, in software design or consulting services, investments undertaken
to facilitate trade in individual varieties are small and independent, but these investments can be reused for an entire
spectrum of di¤erentiated product varieties.
8To be more specic, we assume that each country is populated by identical agents whose preferences over con-
sumption of the goods can be represented by a quasilinear utility function. This allows us to restrict our analysis
to the aggregate utility functions. Letting goods be denoted by subscripts, the home and foreign country utility
functions take the form: (Qx; Qy) = (Qx) + (Qy) and (Qx; Q

y) = 
(Qx) + 
(Qy) where the sub-utility
functions () and () are strictly concave in quantities of the consumed goods. For the case of the di¤erentiated
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Both countries are large enough to a¤ect the terms of trade through an import tari¤, which
is the only policy instrument available to the countries governments. Although good y can be
shipped costlessly, importing good x from the foreign to the home country is costly. The per-unit
cost of shipping good x from the foreign to the home country v = v(K) is a decreasing function of
capital stock of trade-related infrastructure K. When there is an opportunity, the foreign country
can increase the stock of the infrastructure K by making an investment. K is specic to the
relationship between the home and the foreign countries and cannot be used to reduce trade costs
with other potential trade partners. For simplicity we assume that the per-period investment is a
binary variable: I = f0; 1g: The cost of investment is c: The investment opportunities arrive at a
Poisson rate .
We follow the earlier literature on political economy of trade policy (e.g., Baldwin 1987, Bag-
well and Staiger, 2005) and assume that each government seeks to maximize a weighted sum of
the producer surplus, the consumer surplus and the tari¤ revenue. While the foreign government
weighs equally all components of the social welfare, the home government puts a relatively greater
weight on the import-competing producer surplus. Specically, let  > 1 denote the random para-
meter representing the weight placed by the home government on its import-competing producer
surplus. Then the single-period welfare functions of countries given tari¤ choices  and  and
the transportation cost v(K) are denoted by U( ; ; ;K); U( ; ;K). We make a number
of conventional assumptions on U( ; ; ;K) and U( ; ;K) to ensure the existence of static
best response functions that generate Nash equilibria in tari¤s.9 High tari¤s  or  lead to the
autarky outcome, in which welfare levels of both countries are taken to be zero. For lower levels of
 and , trade volume is positive, and the welfare of each country is strictly positive, di¤erentiable
and strictly quasi-concave in the countrys tari¤ level.
Let b(; ;K) and b( ;K) be the values of  and  that maximize the respective welfare
functions of the two countries, i.e., the countrys best response tari¤s. Given that  is the weight
of the import-competing producer surplus in the home country welfare, it is natural to assume thatb > 0. The Nash equilibrium tari¤s are denoted by bN (;K) > 0; and bN (K) > 0. We assume
that all realizations of  are consistent with strictly positive trade volumes under Nash equilibrium
tari¤s. The Nash equilibrium welfare levels are UN () and UN ().
good x available in a continuum of varities of measure 1, Qx and Qx are the additively-separable utility indexes
representing consumption of the di¤erentiated product varieties: Qx = 	(
1Z
0
 (x(j))dj) and Qx = 	(
1Z
0
 (x(j))dj):
Each variety is supplied by perfectly-competitive constant-returns-to-scale home and foreign suppliers.
9Following Dixit (1987) we assume that balanced-trade and Marshall-Lerner conditions are satised. This ensures
that one countrys unilaterally-optimal tari¤ creates a negative terms-of-trade externality for the other country. Al-
though the phrase terms-of-trade externalityis rarely used in the parlance of real-world trade-policy negotiators, as
Bagwell and Staiger (2002) demonstrate in their recent monograph, the concepts terms-of-trade gainand market-
access restrictiondescribe the single economic experience that occurs when the importing country government raises
its import tari¤ and restricts foreign access to its market.
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The joint welfare of the two countries is given by eU( ; ; ;K)  U +U (hereinafter we will
use tilde for the joint variables). We assume that eU is strictly concave in  for all realizations of
 > 1, so that the jointly optimal home tari¤ is strictly positive and non-prohibitive: E() > 0
(the superscript Estands for e¢ cient). Moreover, @bN ()@ > @E()@ > 0 for all  > 1 consistent
with strictly positive trade volumes under Nash equilibrium tari¤s. We also assume that eU < 0
which implies that E() = 0.
Given our interpretation of , it is natural to assume that its reduction implies a lower jointly-
optimal tari¤ (E > 0) and a greater volume of import in the home country, which increases the
marginal e¤ect of the foreign infrastructure investment on the home country welfare: @U(;
;;K)
@@K <
0. The foreign country can invest either K = 0 or K = 1 per period; the cost of investment
is cK.
The parties discount the future at the common discount rate : (We assume that the capital
stock does not depreciate; non-trivial depreciation rate would simply be added to :)
The countriesmarginal per period payo¤s from the investment are u( ; ; ) = @U(;
;;K)
@K
and u ( ; ) = @U
(;;K)
@K : The joint per period payo¤ is given by eu ( ; ; )  u ( ; ; ) +
u ( ; ) : We introduce a linearization U( ; ;K) = U( ; ;K0 ) +
@U(;;K0 )
@K (K
  K0 ) +
o(K   K0 ) and assume that maximum per period investment K = 1 is small compared to
K. This assumption allows us to neglect the higher-order terms of the Taylor expansion in the
neighborhood ofK0 . Therefore the e¤ect of investment on future payo¤s will be linear.10 Moreover,
we assume that under Nash equilibrium tari¤s the foreign country has no incentives to invest:
u
bN ;bN < c:
3.2 Uncertainty
The home countrys domestic political economy parameter  changes over time. For simplicity,
we assume that this parameter has only two realizations:  can be high  = P (i.e., consistent
with the protectionist stance of the home government) or low  = L < P (i.e., consistent with
the liberal trade-policy stance of the home government): In the latter case, liberal trade policy is
globally optimal (i.e., maximizes joint welfare of the two countries), while if  = P , the global
optimum involves higher trade barriers. Obviously, trade volume and gains from trade under the
liberal trade policy of the home government are greater than they under the protectionist trade
policy.
10 In principle, one can argue for either a convex or for concave relationship between the foreign countrys investment
and welfare. On one hand, the investment cost functions are usually convex. On the other hand, the e¤ect of the
infrastructure investment on the welfare is likely to be concave  the more the parties have invested, the greater
amount is traded, hence the higher return to the investment. As it is hard to determine the nature of the ultimate
e¤ect of K, we use a linear function as the rst approximation. A non-linear relationship would imply similar results
but require more cumbersome derivations.
Linearization also simplies the role of depreciation. If the linearity assumption holds, depreciation does not a¤ect
incentives to invest.
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We distinguish between three states of nature: Good,Medium,and Bad(G, M , and B,
respectively). In both G and M states,  = L; while in state B,  = P : The di¤erence between
the G and M states is that there is no direct transition between states G and B. Essentially, if the
state is G, everyone knows that protectionist preferences are unlikely, while if the present state is
M , the state B is likely to arrive next period.
Formally speaking, we consider a Markov process where the transitions between the three states
occur at given rates. The transitions from state M to states G and B take place at the rates G;
B, respectively. For simplicity, we assume that transitions toM; out of both G and B; states occur
at the same rate : Each row in the transition matrix below represents the probability distribution
of the state in the next period st+1 given the current state st :
st+1 = G
(t+1 = 
L)
st+1 =M
(t+1 = 
L)
st+1 = B
(t+1 = 
P )
st = G
(t = 
L)
1    0
st =M
(t = 
L)
G 1  G   B B
st = B
(t = 
P )
0  1  
We use pt;s to denote the probability of being in state s = G;M;B at time t: Given the initial
distribution (p0;G; p0;M ; p0;B); these probabilities are given by:
pt;G = pG + (p0;G   pG) (1  )t +
G
G + B
(p0;M   pM )

(1  )t   (1    G   B)t

;
pt;M = pM + (p0;M   pM ) (1    G   B)t;
pt;B = pB + (p0;B   pB) (1  )t +
B
G + B
(p0;M   pM )

(1  )t   (1    G   B)t

;
where ps denotes the steady state distribution:
(pG; pM ; pB) =

G
+ G + B
;

+ G + B
;
B
+ G + B

: (1)
The steady state probabilities ps can be derived in either of two ways. First, these probabilities
are the limit distribution for t ! 1 : ps = limt!1 pt;s: Alternatively, ps is the eigenvector of the
transition matrix: if the present state is pt;s = ps; then it will be the same next period pt+1;s = ps:
Note that we introduce three states even though there are only two realizations of the home
country political economy parameter . This makes the structure of uncertainty su¢ ciently rich
to separate trade policy and investment decisions. While liberal trade is optimal in states G and
M , investment should only take place in state G. In state G, it is optimal both to set low tari¤s
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and to invest (as the high level of  is relatively unlikely to occur in the future). In state B, it is
optimal to set higher tari¤s and and have a lower volume of trade so that investment does not pay
o¤. In the intermediate state M , parties trade at the same level as in the state G (as the level of 
is low) but do not invest (as the protectionist preferences  = P are likely to arrive in the future).
We shall also introduce another source of uncertainty: the availability of the investment oppor-
tunity. Investment at time t is only possible if there is an investment opportunity. We assume that
investment opportunity is available with probability ; there is no investment opportunity with
probability 1  : The arrivals of investment opportunities are independent across time periods.
3.3 Timing
The timing is as follows.
Period t begins. State transition is realized. Parties observe the state s = G;M;B and the
political economy parameter  = P ; L: Investment opportunity arrives (with probability )
or does not arrive (with probability 1  ):
Parties choose whether to trade according to an agreement signed in previous periods or to
renegotiate. The renegotiation may replace the existing agreement with a new long-term or
spot trade agreement, or the Nash equilibrium tari¤s. Renegotiation incurs cost :
 If there is an investment opportunity, the foreign country decides whether to invest.
Trade occurs. Period t ends.
3.4 Global returns to investment
We begin our analysis with the rst best for the homogenous good case, and then extend it to the
setup where x is a di¤erentiated product.
Homogenous good.
The rst best level of trade depends on the current state of nature. The jointly optimal tari¤s are
E(); E(): The level of trade is higher in states G and M (when  = L).
Let us now solve for the optimal investment decision (contingent upon the arrival of an invest-
ment opportunity). Investment raises welfare in all states, but the immediate e¤ect of investment is
lower in state B (when  is high) than in statesM and G (and it is the same inM and G states). We
denote the joint per-period return to investment in these states by euL  eu  E(L); E(L); L
and euP  eu  E(P ); E(P ); P  ; respectively. As assumed above, the joint return to investment
is higher under the liberal trade policy: euL > euP :
The decision to invest should take into account the expected global returns to investment which
include the returns in the current state as well as the future transitions to other states of nature.
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LetfWs be the expected social returns to investment where s = G;M;B is the initial state. Once the
investment opportunity arrives in state s; investment is optimal whenever fWs > c: By denition,
fWG = 1
1 + 
heuL + (1  )fWG + fWMi
fWM = 1
1 + 
heuL + (1  G   B)fWM + GfWG + BfWBi
fWB = 1
1 + 
heuP + (1  )fWB + fWMi
where  > 0 is the discount rate.
This system has the following unique solution:
fWM = euL(+ + G) + euPB
(+ + G + B)fWG = euL (+ + G)(+ ) + 2+ euPB
(+ + G + B)(+ )fWB = euL(+ + G)+ euP [B(+ ) + (+ + G)]
(+ + G + B)(+ )
One can easily check that euL > euP implies fWB < fWM < fWG: In state G, the expected returns to
investment are high, as the parties expect relatively long period under low tari¤s; in the states B
and M , longer periods of protectionism are more likely.
Di¤erentiated goods.
Now consider the case of the di¤erentiated product which is available in a continuum of varieties
of measure 1. We assume that investment are additive across the varieties. The crucial assump-
tion is that the per unit cost of trade depends on the aggregate stock of capital K =
R 1
0 K
idi:
This assumption implies that investment is specic to the trading party but not to the variety;
investments in reducing the trade in variety i also reduce the cost of trade in variety j: In reality,
the substitution between the investments in di¤erent product varieties is certainly imperfect, we
consider the extreme case of perfect substitution for the sake of tractability.
We also assume that the shocks are independent and identically distributed across the varieties.
Again, while in reality there is a non-trivial correlation between political interests associated with
di¤erent variety producers, we introduce this extreme assumption to simplify the analysis. For
our qualitative results we only need that the correlation is not perfect (and thus lower than in the
homogenous good case where it is one by denition).
As there is a continuum of product varieties and the shocks are independent, exactly ps per cent
of the varieties are in the state s = G;M;B:Whenever there is an investment opportunity for variety
i, the investment incurs a cost c and results in the expected joint returns ofW =
P
s=G;M;B ps
fWs:11
11This formula assumes that infrastructure is used randomly across sectors in di¤erent states. If the capital is
allocated in a non-random way, the condition (2) below would be even less demanding.
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We do not assume that the parties can only set one tari¤ for all varieties. The government sets
the tari¤s for each variety independently. So at each moment, there is a share pB of varieties with
high tari¤s and 1  pB varieties with low tari¤s.
Assumptions.
Throughout the paper we assume that investment is optimal if the good is di¤erentiated, or if the
good is homogenous and the state is G. If the good is homogenous, but the state is M or B, there
should be no investment.
Assumption A1. The parameters are such that:
fWM < c < W: (2)
This assumption implies fWB < c < fWG since fWB < fWM and fWG > W:
The assumption allows us to focus on the most interesting case. Otherwise, either W < c; and
there is no need for investment in the di¤erentiated good case (and the parties are better o¤ not
signing any trade agreement), or fWM > c; and state M is not di¤erent from state G as in both
states it is optimal to set low tari¤s and invest.
We also make several assumptions on contractibility and renegotiation.
Contractibility. We assume that investment is not contractible. The state of nature is observable
but not veriable. The only contractible variables are the tari¤s and the fact of trade at a given
time.
Renegotiation. During each period, parties can renegotiate the previously concluded agree-
ments. All the bargaining power belongs to the home country. The constant per-period cost of
renegotiation, , is su¢ ciently small compared to the gains from amending the agreement, which
implies that renegotiation will always happen in equilibrium. However, because the renegotiation
costs are not trivial, the parties choose the contract that minimizes these costs.
3.5 First best
The above analysis and assumptions allow for describing the rst best. In the case of the homoge-
nous good, the free trade is optimal in states G andM while the investment is only socially optimal
in state G: The uncertainty is su¢ ciently rich to decouple trade and investment decisions: in state
M the current preferences are pro-trade, so it is optimal to reduce tari¤s, but the protectionist
preferences are likely to emerge in the future. Hence, investment does not pay o¤.
In the di¤erentiated good case, where the investments are perfectly leaky and the share of
varieties in state G is large enough to ensure that W > c; investments are jointly optimal.
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4 Trade agreements and investment
Suppose an investment opportunity arises. We rst derive the incentives to invest under di¤erent
contract types starting with the case of a homogenous good. Then we solve for the di¤erentiated
good case. After that, we compare the renegotiation costs for each case for di¤erent types of
contracts.
4.1 Null contract
We shall rst consider the case of a null contract: countries do not conclude a long-term agreement.
The terms of trade are negotiated on the spot. Since the home country is assumed to have full
bargaining power, the foreign countrys payo¤ is equivalent to its payo¤under the Nash equilibrium.
As per our assumption, the return to investment under the Nash equilibrium tari¤s is insu¢ cient
to cover the investment cost and the foreign country does not invest: u
bN ;bN < c. As we
show below, as long as renegotiation costs are low relative to the returns to investment, the null
contract is outperformed by other agreements.
4.2 Fixed term agreement
The parties sign an agreement to trade for  periods with the tari¤s  ; : (If  is not an integer,
trade in the last period occurs with a probability    int()): Under this agreement, the foreign
countrys payo¤ does not depend on ; therefore the foreign countrys returns to investment only
depend on the contracted tari¤s  ;  (which are set at the low level  = E(L);  = E(L))
and not on the actual state s = G;M;B.
Let v = u
 
E(L); E(L); L

be the one-period return to investment under the agreement
and V  the expected discounted returns to investment received by the foreign country given the
agreement with tari¤s  ;  and the duration  :
V  =
1
1 + 

v + V  1

= v
1  (1 + ) 

+ (1 + )  V 0 :
As argued above, the foreign countrys payo¤ under the null contract is V 0 = u
bN ;bN < c
(regardless of the state s = G;M;B). Hence the foreign countrys payo¤ under the agreement with
tari¤s  ;  and the duration  is
V  = v
 1  (1 + ) 

: (3)
The minimum duration ; that provides the incentive to invest, should solve V 

= c:
Proposition 1 The minimum duration of the xed-term agreement which provides a su¢ cient
incentive for investment is
 =
ln

v
v c

ln (1 + )
:
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Already after one period into the lifetime of the xed-term agreement with the duration  (and
tari¤s  ; ), this agreement no longer provides su¢ cient incentives to invest: V 
 1 < V


= c.
Under this trade agreement, the foreign country is happy with its terms and wants to continue
with the same tari¤s even if state is B; and trade on the same terms is jointly ine¢ cient. There-
fore, once state is B is reached, the home country will immediately ask for renegotiation and will
compensate the foreign country for scrapping the agreement.
4.3 Evergreen agreement
Now consider an agreement that provides an ongoing protection for investment with a requirement
that the unilateral withdrawal from the treaty has to be preceded by a notication of the other
party,  periods in advance of the withdrawal:12 Thus, the agreement stipulates that the parties
trade under the tari¤s E(L); E(L) indenitely; the home country has the right to terminate
the agreement at time t by sending the foreign country a written notice at time t  :
As long as the state is G, there is no need to renegotiate; renegotiation would be a zero-sum
game. Therefore, until the state isB, the parties continue to trade under the terms of the agreement.
Once state B arrives, the agreement is renegotiated. If the state isM and there is no new investment
opportunity, there is also no need to renegotiate. But if an investment opportunity arrives in state
M , the parties do need to renegotiate; otherwise the foreign country would invest, which would
be jointly ine¢ cient. Therefore, the home country o¤ers to terminate the trade agreement and
pays the compensation equivalent to the foreign countrys payo¤ from another -periodsworth of
trade gains under the terms of the agreement relative to its Nash equilibrium payo¤s (therefore
the foreign country obtains V  as dened by (3)).
Now consider the foreign countrys investment decision under the evergreen agreement. Suppose
that the investment opportunity arrives. The foreign countrys returns to investment are as follow.
First, there is a payo¤ v for each period until state B (with  = P ) arrives. Second, there is a
payment equivalent to the payo¤ from  periods of trade gains under the terms of the agreement
 after this state has arrived. Third, there are the payments equivalent to the outside option (i.e.,
the Nash outcome) after the good state returns. The latter e¤ect is trivial as the home country has
all the bargaining power and would capture the entire surplus from returning to high trade volume.
Therefore the foreign countrys returns to investment V ;s; s = G;M;B are as follows:
V ;G =
1
1 + 

v + (1  )V ;G + V ;M

V ;M =
1
1 + 

v + (1  )(1  B   G)V ;M + (1  )GV ;G + ( + (1  )B)V 

V ;B = V


where V  is the return to investment under a xed-term contract of length , and v is the foreign
12An alternative setting is the evergreen contract with a unilateral escape clause (as in Bagwell and Staiger, 2005).
The analysis would be similar but more cumbersome. Therefore we focus on the advance termination notice.
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countrys one-period return to investment given that trade takes place under the contracted tari¤s
 ; : In state B, it is jointly e¢ cient to terminate the contract. In order for the foreign country
to agree to the immediate termination, the home country has to compensate the foreign country
with a one-time payment V  for the foregone -periodsworth of returns of investment under the
trade agreement relative to the returns under the Nash tari¤s. In state G, the foreign country
will receive one-periods worth of returns v and the expected returns for the next period (V ;G
with probability 1    and V ;M with probability ): In the intermediate state, M , the parties
have to take into the account the need to renegotiate the contract in case there is an investment
opportunity. If there is no investment opportunity (probability 1   ), the parties continue to
trade under the present contract until state B arrives. If this happens (unconditional probability
(1  )B), parties terminate the contract and the home country pays the foreign country a lump-
sum payment V  : If the investment opportunity arrives, the contract provides the foreign country
with incentives to invest. On the other hand, if the investment opportunity does arrive in state M ,
seizing this opportunity is jointly ine¢ cient. Hence, it is optimal to pay V  to the foreign country
and terminate the contract immediately.
The solution to the system above is as follows:
V ;G =
v

+ +  + (B + G)(1  ) + [1  (1 + ) ]  ( + G(1  ))
+ +  + (B + G)(1  ) +  ( + G(1  ))
where we used the expression for V  from (3):
To nd the minimum termination notice time , that provides su¢ cient investment incentives,
we need to solve V ;G = c:
Proposition 2 The minimum advance termination notice time  of the evergreen agreement to
provide incentives for investment is13
 =
ln

v
v c
h
1 + +++(B+G)(1 )(+G(1 ))
i 1
ln (1 + )
=   
ln

1 + +++(B+G)(1 )(+G(1 ))

ln (1 + )
:
4.4 The optimal agreement
Let us now calculate the expected renegotiation costs under each agreement. Suppose that the par-
ties sign the xed-term agreement (in state G given an investment opportunity). Once it is signed,
it provides su¢ cient incentives to invest in the rst period of the agreements duration. In the
subsequent periods, four contingencies can arise. First, if another investment opportunity arrives,
the parties need to sign a new xed-term agreement. Second, state M can arrive; no renegotiation
is needed since the remaining duration of the existing xed-term agreement is insu¢ cient to provide
13See Guriev and Kvasov (2005) for a detailed intuition for why the optimal advance notice  is shorter than the
optimal duration of the xed-term contract :
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incentives for investment. Hence, the foreign country will not invest. Third, state B may eventu-
ally arrive. Then the parties renegotiate. Fourth, the state may remain good but no investment
opportunity arrives; there is no need for renegotiation.
Now, let us consider the evergreen agreement. Here the situation is di¤erent. If an investment
opportunity does arrive in state G, there is no need for renegotiation. But if an investment oppor-
tunity arrives in state M , then the parties renegotiate to rule out the investment; they replace the
evergreen contract with a null contract. The same happens if state B arrives.
We can now compare the expected renegotiation costs under the xed-term agreement and
under the evergreen agreement.
Proposition 3 In the case of homogenous good, the parties will choose the xed-term agreement
whenever the risk of investment in the intermediate state is su¢ ciently high (i.e.,  and  are
su¢ ciently high, and/or G is su¢ ciently low).
The Proof is relegated to Appendix A.
Proposition 3 is quite intuitive. As discussed above, the benet of the xed-term agreement
is to prevent the suboptimal over-investment. Therefore, the xed-term agreement is preferred
when the intermediate state is more likely ( is high relative to G;B) and investment opportunity
is more likely to arrive (high ). By contrast, the evergreen agreement works well if state G is
more likely; in this case, the evergreen agreement continues to provide incentives for (optimal)
investment. Therefore the evergreen agreement is chosen whenever state G is more likely (high
G). We were unable to obtain unambiguous comparative statics with regard to B as the arrival
of state B results in renegotiation under both types of contracts.
To understand the economics of the Proposition, consider the case of trade in commodities that
requires a lumpy infrastructure investment. To provide incentives for this investment, parties sign a
long-term agreement; but what should the agreements structure be? This depends on the political
and economic environment. Suppose that the parties expect that the current pro-trade stance in
the home country is likely to change in the future. Then it is wiser to sign a xed-term agreement
which provides strong incentives today but weaker incentives in the future; hence the agreement will
discourage the suboptimal overinvestment tomorrow. If, on the other hand, the current pro-trade
political equilibrium is likely to stay, then the evergreen contract is better. Indeed, it will provide
equally strong incentives today and tomorrow, hence no need to renegotiate tomorrow.
In the analysis above, the optimal long-term trade agreements include tari¤s that are constant
over time. This is an implication of the simple structure of uncertainty and non-trivial renegotiation
costs. In principle, investment incentives can also be protected by contracts with variable tari¤s,
for example, high tari¤s in some periods and low tari¤s in other periods. The tari¤ levels can be
chosen so that the agreement would also provide e¢ cient incentives in the rst period; also, like
the optimal xed-term contract above, such a contract would prevent overinvestment one period
into the life of the agreement, the parties do not have incentives to invest. However, the contracts
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with variable tari¤s involve excessive renegotiation: if the economy is in state G in the next period,
the parties will have to renegotiate. In the xed-term contract with constant tari¤s (which are
endogenously chosen to maximize joint welfare), such renegotiation is not needed.
4.5 Trade in di¤erentiated goods
In the case of trade in di¤erentiated goods, the analysis is straightforward. At each period, there
are investment opportunities for  > 0 varieties. The xed-term agreement should therefore be
constantly renegotiated. Expected renegotiation costs are  per period.
Under the evergreen agreement, if the investment is not too costly, the parties are better o¤
not renegotiating at all and just allowing all investment opportunities to be exploited. (2) in
assumption A1 above implies that the parties are better o¤ to allow investments whenever an
investment opportunity arrives. Therefore in the case of di¤erentiated goods, the parties prefer the
evergreen agreement.
Proposition 4 If assumption A1 holds, then in the case of di¤erentiated goods, the parties always
choose the evergreen agreement with a termination notice .
What happens if the assumption A1 does not hold and W < c? In this case, it is never optimal
to invest in the case of di¤erentiated goods. The parties will therefore have no need to sign a long-
term trade agreement because of the hold-up problem, in equilibrium there will be no investment
(which is optimal).
In our model, the termination notice is never used. This is explained by the fact that we
consider a continuum of di¤erentiated good varieties, of which exactly pB =
B
+G+B
are in state
B; the probability of many more varieties being in the protectionist state is trivial. In reality, if
there is a discrete set of goods and there is a positive (albeit small) probability that all (or very
many) of them are in state B; then the home country may sometimes use the advance notice to
terminate the agreement.
4.6 Robustness
The model above makes a number of simplifying assumptions. The main results are robust to the
choice of uncertainty and investment technology. E.g., if the state space were richer and investments
were continuous rather than binary, the results would still hold. The xed-term agreement would
still be chosen to provide incentives for a lumpy one-o¤ investment once it is signed but not
later. In the subsequent periods, the incentives would be weakened and the foreign country would
underinvest. Vice versa, the evergreen agreement would provide the same incentives to invest both
at the moment of its inception and in the subsequent periods, thus encouraging small and frequent
investments. These results may also be generalized to the case where optimal level of investment
is not constant in time as discussed in Guriev and Kvasov (2005), these may be incentivized via
an evergreen agreement with an advanced notice period that changes over time.
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We do not consider other properties of di¤erentiated goods such as elasticities of substitution,
market power, entry, etc. the only feature that matters for the model above is the fact that in
the di¤erentiated-good case, investments are small and frequent rather than one-o¤ and lumpy.
Our model assumes full inter-variety spillovers of investment in the di¤erentiated good case. This
is certainly an extreme assumption. Yet, our qualitative argument holds to the extent that these
spillovers are not trivial. Similarly, while we assume a perfect independence between political
economy shocks for individual varieties, our argument only requires that the correlation between
these shocks is not perfect. What we essentially need is to make sure that in the case of di¤erentiated
goods the risk of overinvestment is lower than in the case of homogenous goods. In such a modied
set up, the law of large numbers would not apply, and the analysis would be more involved. In
particular, even in the case of di¤erentiated goods, there will be some states of nature where the
parties will prefer the xed-term contract to the evergreen one. Yet, even in this case, an evergreen
agreement will be more likely to be chosen in the case of di¤erentiated rather than homogenous
good if the renegotiation cost is non-trivial.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we argue that the duration and the time structure of trade agreements are driven
by the characteristics of traded goods covered by the agreement and the nature of trade-related
investments. Even when trade agreements do not explicitly include provisions on such investments,
they certainly a¤ect the partiesincentives for undertaking them. Therefore, whenever the parties
choose the structure of the trade agreement, they have to address the trade-o¤ between providing
the incentives for making e¢ cient investments, and the exibility of being able to terminate or
modify the agreement in order to prevent the ine¢ cient investments. If the agreement is set
to expire too soon, it does not protect irreversible investment in trade-related infrastructure. If
the agreement is meant to last too long, it reduces the exibility of the trading parties to use
the trade policies for adjusting the terms of trade if there is a change in preferences or other
economic parameters. Although the parties can always renegotiate the trade agreement that might
have become ine¢ cient due to a realization of the uncertainty, such a renegotiation is costly and,
therefore, it is in the interest of both parties to choose a trade agreement that would minimize
the expected renegotiation costs. We show that the contracting parties are able to resolve the
incentive-exibility trade-o¤while at the same time minimizing the renegotiation costs through the
use of two instruments: the duration of the trade agreement (short-term vs. long-term) and its time
structure (xed-term agreement vs. evergreen agreement with an advance termination notice).
If the parties trade in a homogeneous good, they are more likely to need an agreement that
protects incentives for lumpy irreversible investments. Therefore, the parties will choose a xed-
term trade agreement. Once there is an opportunity for a new investment project, they conclude
a new xed-term agreement of a su¢ cient duration. By contrast, if trade is in di¤erentiated
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good varieties, the investments necessary to facilitate such trade are likely to be in the form of
multiple small-scale projects initiated independently for each variety, but increasing trade gains for
the industry as a whole. In this case, there is a need for the provision of ongoing trade-related
investment incentives for the entire industry. Therefore parties will opt for an evergreen contract
with a termination notice.
This prediction seems to be in line with available anecdotal and empirical evidence. In Appendix
B, we consider the sample of on-going trade agreements to which the U.S. is a party. Most of these
agreements can be classied as either evergreen or xed-term. The econometric analysis of this
sample suggests that trade agreements that cover trade in homogenous goods are normally xed-
term, while the agreements that concern trade in di¤erentiated goods and services are mostly
evergreen. Our predictions are consistent with the data even when we control for the level of
development and political institutions.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3.
Denote RFTs the expected renegotiation costs under the xed-term given the state is s; and rs
the expected renegotiation costs if there is no contract. Then
RFTG =
1
1 + 

 (1  ) (+RFTG ) + (1  ) (1  )RFTG + RFTM

RFTM =
1
1 + 

(1  G   B)RFTM + GRFTG + BRFTB

RFTB =
1
1 + 
[+ (1  ) rB + rM ]
rG =
1
1 + 

 (1  ) (+minfRFTG ; REGG g) + (1  ) (1  ) rG + rM

rM =
1
1 + 
[(1  G   B) rM + GrG + BrB]
rB =
1
1 + 
[(1  ) rB + rM ]
Now consider the evergreen contract. Here the situation is di¤erent. If an investment opportu-
nity does arrive in the state G, there is no need for renegotiation. But an investment opportunity
arrives in state M , then the parties need to renegotiate to rule out the investment. Also, renegoti-
ation happens once the state B has arrived.
REGG =
1
1 + 

(1  )REGG + REGM

REGM =

1 + 
[+ (1  G   B) rM + GrG + BrB] +
+
1  
1 + 

(1  G   B)REGM + GREGG + BREGB

REGB =
1
1 + 
[+ (1  ) rB + rM ]
Let us solve for s = REGs   rs and s = RFTs   REGs : In the end of the day we are interested
in the parameter constellation that imply G < 0: Let also us introduce  = (1  G   B) M +
GG + BB:
We can see right away that B = 0 and B = 1+ : Now lets write the equations for the
remaining s and s
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G =
1
1 + 
[ (1  )+ (1  )G + M ]
M =
1
1 + 

(1  G   B)M + GG   + 

G =
1
1 + 
[(1  ) (1  )G + M    (1  )   (1  )minfG; 0g]
M =
1
1 + 

(1  ) + 
The rst two equations imply
G = 
((1  )(+ G + B)  ) + 
(+ + G + B) + B
(4)
[+  + (1  )] G =  1
1 + 

(1  ) +    (1  )   (1  )minfG; 0g
G =
   (1  G   B) 11+

(1  ) +   B 1+
G
=
=
[+  + (G + B)(1  )]     (1  G   B)  B
(1 + )G
Therefore
[+  + (1  )] [+  + (G + B)(1  )]     (1  G   B)  B
= G(1  ) + G   (1  ) (1 + )G    (1  ) (1 + )GminfG; 0g
When is the xed-term contract preferred? Consider the case G < 0: Then
[+  + (1  )] [+  + (G + B)(1  )]     (1  G   B)  B
= G(1  ) + G   (1  ) (1 + )G    (1  ) (1 + )GG
 ([+  + (1  )] [+  + (G + B)(1  )]  G(1  ))
=  (G    (1  ) (1 + )G + [+  + (1  )] [ (1  G   B) + B])
  (1  ) (1 + )GG
We need to substitute  from (4), nd G and check that G < 0: This holds if and only if
0 > G [  (1  ) (1 + )] +  [+  + (1  )] [ (1  G   B) + B] +
 [(1  ) (+  + G + B)  ] [[+  + (1  )] [+  + (G + B)(1  )]  G(1  )]
It is easy to show that (i) this is never the case if  ! 0 and/or  ! 0 (ii) this is the case if
! 1;  ! 1:
Q.E.D.
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Appendix B: Empirical analysis of fixed-term vs. evergreen
agreements.
In order to make the factors affecting the duration and terms structure of trade agreements more
concrete, we now provide a simple empirical evidence for our theoretical model. We would like to stress
that given the limitations of the data and the limited nature of the statistical tests presented below, the
following analysis perhaps should be seen more as an empirical illustration rather than a rigorous test of
the theory outlined in this paper.
In keeping with the results of our model, we hypothesize that those trade agreements, which
cover trade in more commoditized goods, are less likely to be evergreen. We test this hypothesis using a
data set of 178 bilateral and plurilateral trade agreements to which the US is currently a party. The texts of
all of these agreements are available at the website of the US Trade Compliance Center (TCC).1 The
benefit of using the TCC’s data is that (i) they provide a comprehensive list of all agreements currently
effective in the US, and (ii) all TCC agreements are comparable as they share at least one common party,
the United States.2
Since we are interested only in those trade agreements that have direct bearing on the terms of
trade, we have excluded from the TCC’s data set all the agreements that are not explicitly related to trade
in goods or services (e.g., agreements on investment measures). We have also omitted the agreements
which we have not been able to classify as either fixed-term or evergreen. As a result, we ended up with
the sample consisting of 98 agreements, of which 30 are fixed-term and 68 are evergreen.
Among the 98 agreements in the data set, we have identified 42 agreements, which cover goods
or services trade which cannot be classified as trade in commodities. We classified the remaining 56 trade
agreements, which are either comprehensive or dedicated to specific commodities, as commodity-related.
1 See tcc.export.gov2 Another potential source of data for our empirical analysis is the WTO data set of regional trade agreements
(RTAs) notified by the countries to the GATT/WTO either under GATT Article XXIV or GATS Article V or the
Enabling Clause of the Tokyo Round Agreement which permits preferential arrangements among developing
countries in goods trade. However, many sector-specific bilateral agreements between the WTO member countries
are not notified to the WTO because they are considered to be side-agreements to the RTAs which are supposed to
cover “substantially all” trade. The problem is that the RTAs and their side-agreements often have entirely different
final clause provisions regarding treaty duration and termination. For example, while the CUFTA is an evergreen
agreement, the Canada-U.S. Softwood Lumber Agreement is a fixed term agreement concluded for 5 years. Also,
the WTO data set does include asymmetric market opening agreements in which one country (or a group of
countries) lowers barriers for products from certain other countries (e.g., the Lome convention agreements between
the EU and former colonies). The absence of such sector-specific side-agreements and asymmetric agreements in the
WTO data set makes it unsuitable for our empirical investigation.
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The details of this classification are provided in Table 4 below, where the variable Trade in Commodities
is 0 if the trade agreement is not related to commodities and 1 otherwise.
We employed a number of explanatory variables which may potentially influence the duration
and term structure of trade agreements. Since, according to our theory, the optimal type of the agreement
depends on the parameters representing the volatility of the political economy environment, we chose to
control for the type of political institutions, which may influence the stability. We used variable DEMOC
from Polity IV data set to construct variable Level of democracy which captures the stability of political
institutions. In addition, we employed two variables, Log GDP per capita of trade partners and Log GDP
per capita of trade partners relative to US to control for the level of economic development of the US
trade agreement partners. In constructing these variables we used the World Development Indicators to
calculate the GDP per capita for the US agreements’ partner countries. For the plurilateral agreements, we
calculated the weighted average GDP per capita for the agreements’ member countries (other than the
U.S.) weighted by their population shares.
The dependent variable we seek to explain in our analyses is Fixed Term, which is 1 if the final
clause of the agreement specifies that it is concluded for a finite period of time and not supposed to be
renewed unless parties renegotiate the renewal. It is 0 if the agreement is supposed to remain valid
indefinitely unless a party decides to withdraw and gives an advance notice about this to the other parties.
Of the 98 agreements in our data set, 30 were of fixed duration (coded 1). The main characteristics of
fixed-term and evergreen agreements are compared in Table 1 in the Introduction. Tables B1 and B2 in
the end of this Appendix present the summary statistics and the pairwise correlations for all the variables.
The data suggests that fixed-term agreements are more likely to cover trade in commodities and to be
concluded with less developed and less democratic countries; the differences are significant.
These effects hold in the multivariate regressions as well. As the Table B3 below shows, fixed-
term agreements, to which the U.S. is a party, are indeed more likely to be associated with trade in
commodities even when we control for the level of economic development in the U.S. trade-partner
countries. This result holds when the level of development is represented by the per capita GDP of trade
partners as well as their per capita GDP relative to that of the U.S. level. We also find that the degree of
democracy turns out to be insignificant once we control for the level of development.
Next, in order to perform a robustness check, we excluded all the agreements, which, in our
reading, were concluded mainly to protect access of the US exporters to the foreign markets, and the
intellectual property rights agreements (which are also more likely to benefit the U.S. exporters of goods
and services). We ended up with the reduced sample of 54 agreements. In this sample, the fixed term
agreements are also more likely to be associated with trade in commodities. While 75% of the evergreen
agreements are related to trade in commodities, the share of agreements covering commodities among the
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fixed-term agreements is 95%. In fact, there is only 1 fixed-term agreement in the reduced sample which
is dedicated to trade which cannot be categorized as commodity trade.
We run the same regressions for the reduced sample (Table B3) and find similar results. Only in
the last specification, the coefficient of the Trade in Commodities dummy is not significant which may be
explained by the small sample size.
In order to perform yet another robustness check, we excluded all the agreements between the
U.S. and other developed countries (i.e., the OECD countries). While some of these agreements may
contain provisions relevant for trade in commodities, the actual share of this kind of trade is relatively
small in overall trade between the U.S. and other developed countries if compared with its share in trade
between the U.S. and non-OECD countries. After omitting these agreements, the sample is reduced to 54
agreements, 27 of which are fixed term agreements and 27 are evergreen agreements. Among the 27 fixed
term agreements, 22 cover trade in commodities (81%); out of the 27 evergreen agreements, only 16
agreements cover trade in commodities (59%). The difference is statistically significant. The results of the
probit regressions for this sample are presented in the last three columns of Table B3. The coefficient of
the commodity trade dummy remains large and significant.
Overall, consistent with our theoretical argument, we find that both pair-wise and controlling for
the level of economic development and democracy, the fixed-term agreements are more likely to be
associated with trade in commodities, rather than in non-commoditized goods and services. The effect is
economically significant: the share of fixed term agreements among commodities vs. non-commoditized
goods differs by 20-30 percentage points.
Again, we warn that although the presented empirical evidence provides support for our theory,
our analysis of the current trade agreements between the U.S. and other countries is meant to serve as an
illustration of our theory rather than as an indepth empirical study of the trade agreements’ duration. Such
a study would require a more detailed data base including the trade agreements to which the U.S. is not a
party.
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Table B1. Summary statistics.
Variable Observations Mean Std.dev. Min Max
Fixed term dummy 98 0.31 0.46 0.00 1.00
Dummy: covers trade in
commodities
98 0.57 0.50 0.00 1.00
Log (GDP per capita  of trade
partners relative to US) 
98 -1.77 1.57 -4.83 0.21
Log (GDP per capita of trade
partners in 2000 US dollars)
98 8.51 1.59 5.21 10.5
Level of democracy 98 6.77 3.61 0.00 10.0
Table B2. Pairwise correlations (all correlations are significant at 1% level)
Fixed term dummy 1.00
Covers trade in  commodities 0.26 1.00
Log (GDP per capita  of trade
partners relative to US) 
-0.43 -0.26 1.00
Log (GDP per capita of trade
partners in 2000 US dollars)
-0.48 -0.26 0.99 1.00
Level of democracy -0.33 -0.27 0.75 0.75 1.00
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Table B3. Probit regressions for the fixed-term dummy (marginal effects reported).
Dependent variable Dummy for fixed term agreements
Sample Full sample Reduced sample Non-OECD partners
Covers trade in  commodities 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.36 0.29 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.28
(0.09)* (0.09)* (0.09)* (0.13)*** (0.17)* (0.19) (0.14)* (0.14)* (0.14)**
-0.12 -0.13 -0.10 -0.08 -0.08Log (GDP per capita  of trade
partners relative to US)  (0.03)*** (0.05)*** (0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
-0.16 -0.18 -0.13Log (GDP per capita of trade
partners in 2000 US dollars) (0.05)*** (0.07)*** (0.07)*
Level of democracy 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 98 98 98 54 54 54 54 54 54
Pseudo R-squared 0.19 0.19 0.22 0.06 0.14 0.19 0.06 0.06 0.09
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
 population-weighted-averaged across trade partners at the time of signing
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Table B4. Classification of US trade agreements.
Agreement Yearsigned
Fixed
term
Trade in
commodities
GDP pc
relative to
US
APEC Telecommunications MRA 1998 0 0 11.8%
Bulgaria Agreement On Trade Relations 1991 1 1 5.7%
Canada Magazines Agreement 1999 0 0 65.9%
European Union Agreement On Trade In Large Civil Aircraft 1992 0 0 62.9%
India Motion Pictures Agreement 1992 0 0 1.1%
Indonesia Conditions For Market Access For Films And Videos 1992 0 0 2.4%
Israel Free Trade Agreement 1985 0 1 51.2%
Japan Agreement Clarifying The Framework Agreement 1994 0 1 117.8%
Japan Computer Products And Services Agreement 1992 0 0 121.8%
Japan Distilled Spirits Agreement 1997 0 1 115.2%
Japan Enhanced Initiative on Deregulation and Competition Policy 1997 0 0 115.2%
Japan Foreign Lawyers Agreement 1987 0 0 107.4%
Japan Framework Agreement 1993 0 1 120.1%
Japan Grademarked Lumber Agreement 1997 0 1 115.2%
Japan Major Projects Arrangement 1991 1 0 123.2%
Japan Ports And Harbor Practices Agreement 1997 0 0 115.2%
Japan Public Sector Procurement Of Telecommunications Products And
Services Agreement
1994 0 0 117.8%
Japan Public Works Agreement (1994) 1994 0 0 117.8%
Japan Report On Medical Equipment And Pharmaceuticals Market-
Oriented, Sector-Selective (MOSS) Discussions
1986 0 0 106.5%
Japan Satellite Procurement Agreement 1990 0 0 117.8%
Kazakhstan Trade Relations Agreement 1993 1 1 4.3%
Korea Understanding On Telecommunications--2/17/92 1992 0 0 26.5%
North American Free Trade Agreement 1994 0 1 29.7%
Romania Agreement On Trade Relations 1992 1 1 5.4%
Russia Memorandum of Understanding On Aircraft Market Access 1996 0 0 5.1%
Russia Trade Relations Agreement And Annexes Concerning Settlement
Of Lend-Lease Accounts And Status Of Commercial Office In Moscow
1992 1 1 7.4%
Semiconductors Joint Statement 1999 1 0 68.7%
Ukraine Trade Relations Agreement 1992 1 1 4.0%
Agreement on Mutual Acceptance of Oenological Practices 2001 0 0 32.1%
Albania Trade Relations Agreement 1992 1 1 2.3%
Australia Free Trade Agreement 2004 0 1 62.2%
Australia Understanding on Automotive Leather Subsidies 2000 0 1 60.3%
Bahrain Free Trade Agreement 2004 0 1 1.1%
Belarus Memorandum of Understanding on Textiles 2004 1 1 4.7%
Belarus Memorandum of Understanding on Textiles 2002 1 1 4.1%
Belarus Memorandum of Understanding on Textiles 2003 1 1 4.3%
Belgium Friendship, Establishment and Navigation Treaty 1963 1 1 56.9%
European Union Mutual Recognition Agreement on Marine Equipment 2003 0 0 60.6%
Cambodia Trade Relations & Intellectual Property Rights Agreement 1996 1 0 0.8%
Canada Agreement On Beer Market Access In Quebec And British
Columbia
1994 0 0 65.9%
Canada Agreement Regarding Tires 1993 0 0 65.3%
Canada Memorandum Of Understanding On Provincial Beer Marketing
Practices
1992 0 0 65.4%
Canada Termination Of Bell Canada/Northern Telecom Preferred
Supplier Relationship Agreement
1994 0 0 65.9%
Central American/Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement 2004 0 1 5.4%
Chile Free Trade Agreement 2003 0 1 14.7%
Chile Memorandum Of Understanding On Aquatic Health Systems 2001 0 1 14.5%
Denmark Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Treaty 1961 1 1 91.7%
European Union Distilled Spirits And Spirit Drinks Agreement 1994 0 1 58.3%
European Union Mutual Recognition Agreement 1997 0 1 60.2%
European Union Pasta Agreement 1987 0 0 59.6%
European Union Understanding on Bananas 2001 0 1 61.4%
Hungary Intellectual Property Rights Agreement 1993 1 1 12.3%
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Jamaica Intellectual Property Rights Agreement 1994 1 0 10.8%
Japan--Tokyo Declaration On Global Partnership With The US 1992 0 1 121.8%
Japan Cellular Telephone And Third Party Radio Agreement (1989) 1989 0 0 113.1%
Japan Economic Partnership 2001 0 1 106.5%
Japan International Value-Added Network Services Agreement 1990 0 0 117.8%
Japan International Value-Added Network Services Agreement (#2 Of 2) 1991 0 0 123.2%
Japan Mutual Understanding On Patents 1995 0 1 118.0%
Japan Supercomputer Procurement Agreement 1990 0 0 117.8%
Japan Wood Products Agreement 1990 0 1 117.8%
Jordan Free Trade Agreement 2000 0 1 5.0%
Korea Intellectual Property Rights & Insurance Understandings 1986 0 0 18.6%
Korea Market Access For Wine And Wine Products Agreement 1989 0 0 21.8%
Korea Motion Pictures Importation And Distribution Agreement 1988 0 0 21.2%
Korea Revised Cigarette Agreement 1995 0 0 30.6%
Latvia Trade Relations And IPR Agreement 1994 1 1 8.0%
Madagascar Navigation and Commerce Treaty 1960 1 1 2.8%
Mexico Fresh Tomatoes Antidumping Investigation Suspension
Agreement
2002 0 1 16.9%
Mexico Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services 2004 0 0 16.6%
Mexico Tires Certification Agreement 1996 0 1 16.5%
Morocco Free Trade Agreement 2004 0 1 3.7%
Nicaragua Intellectual Property Rights Agreement 1998 1 0 2.3%
North American Free Trade Side Agreement On Environmental
Cooperation
1993 0 1 29.7%
Oman Amity, Economic Relations And Consular Rights Treaty 1960 1 1 6.7%
Pakistan Friendship and Commerce Treaty 1961 1 1 1.3%
People's Republic Of China Trade Relations Agreement 1979 1 1 0.8%
Russia Agreement On Firearms And Ammunition 1996 0 0 5.1%
Russia Ammonium Nitrate Antidumping Investigation Suspension
Agreement
2000 0 1 5.1%
Russia Bilateral Textile Agreement 1997 0 1 5.0%
Russia Cut-to-Length Carbon Steel Plate Antidumping Investigation
Suspension Agreement
2003 0 1 6.0%
Russia Hot-Rolled Flat-Rolled Carbon-Quality Steel Products
Antidumping Investigation Suspension Agreement
1999 0 1 4.8%
Russia Uranium Antidumping Investigation Suspension Agreement 1993 0 1 5.2%
Russia Visa Arrangement Concerning Textiles And Textile Products 1996 0 1 5.1%
Singapore Free Trade Agreement 2004 0 1 68.2%
Sri Lanka Intellectual Property Rights Agreement 1991 1 0 2.1%
Thailand Cigarettes Agreement 1990 0 0 5.1%
Togo Amity and Economic Relations Treaty 1967 1 1 1.6%
Trinidad And Tobago Intellectual Property Rights Agreement 1994 1 0 16.7%
Turkey Foreign Film Revenues WTO Settlement 1997 0 0 9.3%
Ukraine Bilateral Textile Agreement 2001 1 1 2.0%
Ukraine Cut-to-Length Carbon Steel Plate Antidumping Investigation
Suspension Agreement
1997 0 1 1.9%
Ukraine Visa Arrangement Concerning Textiles And Textile Articles 1997 0 1 1.9%
Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement 2000 1 1 1.1%
Vietnam Establishment Of Copyright Relations Agreement 1997 0 0 1.1%
Macedonia (Former Yugoslav Republic Of) Commercial Relations Treaty 1991 1 1 6.9%
Slovenia Commercial Relations Treaty 1991 1 1 26.3%
Croatia Commercial Relations Treaty 1991 1 1 13.5%
